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SUMMARY 
 
Before the introduction of the concept of constructive dismissal in the LRA, the old 
industrial courts relied on the strides made in this field by the English and American 
courts.  Constructive dismissal is the fourth type of dismissal and it is instituted by 
the employee through his/her resignation, unlike the other three types of dismissals 
which is instituted by the employer.  
 
Section 186(e) of the LRA defines constructive dismissal as the termination a 
contract of employment with or without notice by the employee because the 
employer made continued employment intolerable for the employee.  With a 
fundamental breach in the contract of employment employees have a choice to 
either base their claims on constructive dismissal in the LRA or repudiation of the 
contract in common law, depending on the circumstances. 
 
Landmark judgments like Jooste v Transnet and Pretoria Society for the Care of the 
Retarded v Loots set the tone for constructive dismissal law in South Africa.  It 
introduced the concept of intolerability as well as looking at the employer‟s conduct 
as a whole and judging it reasonable.  The test for constructive dismissal throughout 
the evolution of case law in South Africa has not changed.  Constructive Dismissal 
under the common law is also discussed in depth by looking at the landmark 
judgment of Murray v Minister of Defence. 
 
Sexual Harassment in the workplace is of a growing concern.  If continued sexual 
harassment makes continued employment intolerable, the employee subjected to the 
harassment has the option of resigning and approaching the CCMA or bargaining 
councils, and claim that they have been constructively dismissed.  Cases such as 
Payten v Premier Chemicals and Gerber v Algorax (Pty) Ltd really shows us how 
difficult it is to proof constructive dismissal as a result of sexual harassment because 
in most instances there won‟t be witnesses and it would be a case of he said, she 
said.  These cases also show us that it can be proven based on a balance of 
probabilities.  
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Grogan states that in dismissal proceedings, the onus is on the employees to prove 
that they were in fact dismissed and on the employer to show that the dismissal was 
fair.  Section 192 of the LRA places another burden on the employee that requires 
him to not only prove the existence of a dismissal, but also that the conduct of the 
employer was intolerable. 
 
Unlike normal dismissal cases, commissioners generally award compensation as a 
remedy for constructive dismissal.  A claim by an employee for reinstatement would 
be contradicting a claim that the employment relationship became intolerable and an 
award for reinstatement would be very inappropriate in a case of constructive 
dismissal.  
 
In short, unlike a normal dismissal, a constructive dismissal is a termination of the 
employment contract by the employee rather than the employer‟s own immediate 
act. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African dismissal law is based on the premise of fairness.  There are four 
types of dismissals; three of which is instigated by the employer, and one instigated 
by the employee.  The latter is what is of interest for this paper.  It is a very unusual 
form of dismissal and it has crept into the industrial court‟s jurisprudence before the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA).  The concept of constructive dismissal is 
seen to be in contrast to that of an actual dismissal.  This is because an actual 
dismissal is where the employer terminates the contract of employment, whilst 
constructive dismissal is a result of the employee terminating the employment 
contract. 
 
With the conclusion of an employment contract exists an employment relationship 
which consists of two parties, of which any one can terminate the relationship at any 
time.  Constructive dismissal is where the employee ends the relationship by either 
abandoning the contract or by resigning.  Before the introduction of the concept of 
constructive dismissal in the LRA, the old industrial courts relied on the strides made 
in this field by the English and American courts.  
 
The English case of Woods v WM Car Services,1 has to do with a constructive 
dismissal and Lord Denning in this case said that, “the circumstances of constructive 
dismissal are so infinitely various that there can be, and is, no rule of law saying 
what circumstances justify and what do not. It is a question of fact for the tribunal …”. 
 
This is true today in our current environment as it was back then in the English law.  
Some of these circumstances include the unilateral changes in a contract of 
employment, rude and vulgar language and sexual harassment.  The statutory 
definition of a constructive dismissal can be found in the LRA2 which defines it as the 
termination of a contract of employment by an employee, with or without notice as a 
result of the employer making continued employment intolerable for the employee.  It 
                                                     
1
  (1982) IRLR 413 (CA) at 415. 
2
  Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
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is, however, very difficult to prove in the Labour Court and at the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). 
 
When determining whether an employee was constructively dismissed, there are 
certain issues that need to be determined.  The one is whether the employee 
actually met the first requirement of bringing the contract to an end as opposed to 
the employer bringing the contract to an end.  This might seem straightforward, but it 
is not always the case.  What if an employee resigns, and during his notice period, 
the employee gets dismissed.  The case that deals with this anomaly is SALSTAFF 
obo Bezuidenhout v Metrorail. 3   So the question begs; can an employee claim 
constructive dismissal if he is dismissed.   
 
The arbitrator in this case held that the employee‟s resignation was a unilateral act 
by which the employee showed his intention to repudiate the contract on expiring of 
the notice period.4  So despite the dismissal of Mr Bezuidenhout days before the 
expiry of the notice period, it did not preclude him from pursuing his claim for 
constructive dismissal as the resignation had the effect of “terminating” the contract 
for purposes of section 186(e).  The arbitrator concluded that the employee was 
contractually obliged to work during the notice period did not alter the legal 
consequence of the resignation.  
 
Grogan, 5  believes that there is another requirement that precedes the one just 
mentioned.  He declares that even before an employee must prove that he brought 
the contract to an end, he must prove that an employment relationship exists at the 
time the employee leaves the employer‟s service.  Grogan6 states that, “where an 
employee refused to sign a new contract of employment and „resigned‟ after the 
employer stopped his salary, the court held that the employee could not have been 
constructively dismissed because the employment relationship ended when the 
former contract lapsed”.  
 
                                                     
3
  (2001) 9 BALR 926. 
4
  Supra. 
5
  Workplace Law 9
th
 ed (2007). 
6
  Workplace Law supra. 
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The onus of proving that the reason for the termination of the contract, also rests on 
the employee.  The mere fact that an employee was unhappy in the workplace is not 
enough.  One will have to go beyond the subjective feelings and actually prove that 
the contract was terminated because the employee genuinely believed that the 
employer had rendered the continuation of the employment relationship “intolerable”.  
This belief must not only be reasonable, but the employee must also prove that the 
employer was in fact responsible for creating the conditions that brought about this 
belief.  
 
This is then the fourth requirement and it states that the employee must prove that a 
dismissal within the meaning of section 186(e) has taken place and that the 
circumstances were brought on by the employer.  The intolerable circumstances 
spoken about in section 186(e) must have been brought on by the employer itself, or 
through one of its agents.  An employee can thus succeed in a constructive 
dismissal claim if they can prove that the employer was aware of the employee‟s 
colleagues who created the intolerable circumstances and yet failed to take any 
action.  An employer also then cannot be held to have created intolerable working 
conditions for an employee if those circumstances arose as a result of factors 
beyond the employer‟s control.    
 
The final requirement for proving a constructive dismissal depends on the severity of 
the fourth requirement.  The employee in this instance must prove that they had no 
reasonable option in the circumstances other than to repudiate the contract.  The 
question that begs is whether there were alternatives and, if so, whether those 
alternatives were reasonable.  There are, of course, instances where some action on 
the part of the employee is required to remedy the situation, but in some 
circumstances the employee can justifiably argue that no action in their part could 
possibly remedy the situation.  Where the cause of the employee‟s distress is as a 
result of the conduct of a superior, colleague, or client and it is evident that the 
employer could, and probably would have dealt with the cause of the distress, the 
employee should then first file a complaint before resigning. 
 
These requirements listed above are set out to help employees to successfully argue 
a constructive dismissal case.  They can be compressed into two broad 
4 
requirements.  This manifests in the judgment of Judge Myburgh in the case of 
Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a SA Airways7 where he held that an employee had to 
overcome two obstacles before a claim of constructive dismissal could be accepted.    
 
Judge Nicholson, after Jooste, reported in Pretoria Society for the Care of the 
Retarded v Loots8 that “when an employee resigns or terminates the contract as a 
result of constructive dismissal, such employee was in fact indicating that the 
employee cannot fulfil what is the employee‟s most important function, namely, to 
work.  The employee is, in effect, saying that he or she would have carried on 
working indefinitely had the unbearable situation not been created.  She does so on 
the basis that she does not believe that the employer will ever reform or abandon the 
pattern of creating an unbearable work environment.  If she is wrong in this 
assumption and the employer proves that her fears were unfounded then she has 
not been constructively dismissed and her conduct proves that she has in fact 
resigned”. 
 
This then suggests that our current Act seeks to determine, according to a stricter 
test than the one under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, if the employer‟s 
conduct demonstrated a deliberate and predetermined intention to have the 
employment contract repudiated.  The Courts will consider the circumstances with 
the view to establish whether the employee could have been expected to put up with 
the employer‟s conduct or sought some other form of relief.  
 
Chapter two will look at the concepts of constructive dismissal.  Here definitions of 
an employee, dismissal, resignation, termination of contract of employment, 
continued employment, intolerable and the reasonable person will be discussed.  
Chapter three looks at all the different and latest case law that outlines constructive 
dismissals whilst the fourth chapter reviews constructive dismissal under the 
common law.  Chapter 5 will look at the test for intolerability whilst chapter 6 will look 
at the onus of proof in both the ordinary constructive dismissal as well as those 
involving sexual harassment claims.  Conclusion will follow as chapter 7. 
                                                     
7
  (1995) 16 ILJ 629 (LAC. 
8
  [1997] 6 BLLR 721 (LAC). 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFINING CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
The common law, according to Grogan,9 recognises only dismissals with notice and 
dismissals without notice as forms of dismissal.  The LRA broadens this narrow 
approach to allow for four types of dismissals of which constructive dismissal is one.  
Grogan10 believes that the first question that has to be established in any case 
involving an alleged unfair dismissal is whether a “dismissal” actually occurred, after 
which it will have to be established if the complainant was in fact an employee.  
Because constructive dismissal is also one of the forms of dismissals identified by 
the LRA, the researcher saw fit to firstly discuss these concepts.   
 
2.1 DEFINITION OF A DISMISSAL, EMPLOYEE AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
DISMISSAL  
  
Grogan11 states that a dismissal is normally easy to recognise.  He goes on further to 
say that a dismissal takes place when the employer brings an end to the contract 
and this is normally accompanied by some form of notification, either verbally or by 
conduct, where an example of conduct would be when payment stops.  Dismissal in 
this instance is very narrowly defined and the LRA gives a much broader definition.   
 
Section 186 of the LRA defines dismissal as follows: 
 
(1) “Dismissal” means that –  
(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without 
notice; 
(b) an employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed term 
contract of employment on the same or similar terms, but the employer 
offered to renew it on less favourable terms, or did not renew it; 
(c) an employer refuses to allow an employee to resume work after she –  
(i) took maternity leave in terms of the law, collective agreement or her 
contract of employment; or 
(ii) … [sub par-(ii) deleted by s. 95(4) of Act No. 25 of 1997] 
                                                     
9
  Workplace Law. 
10
  Workplace Law supra. 
11
  Workplace Law supra. 
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(d) an employer who dismissed a number of employees for the same or 
similar reasons has offered to re-employ one or more of them but has 
refused to re-employ another. 
(e) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice 
because the employer made continued employment intolerable for the 
employee, or 
(f) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice 
because the new employer, after a transfer in terms of section 197 or 
section 197A, provided the employee with conditions or circumstances at 
work that are substantially less favourable to the employee than those 
provided by the old employer.”  
 
Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke and Strydom 12  point out that 
because the LRA is concerned with the fairness of a dismissal, it offers a lot of 
protection to employees.  This is unlike the common law that offers basically no 
protection against unfair dismissal as the common law focuses only on the 
lawfulness of the employment contract by the employer.  The fairness or unfairness 
of a termination by the employer is not taken into account by the common law, so the 
reason for dismissal is irrelevant.  
 
When looking at the LRA in trying to define an employee, it gives us a fairly vague 
definition that reads as follows:  
 
- any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the state and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; 13 and  
 
- any other person whom in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer.  
 
For a more comprehensive definition we will have to look at the provisions of section 
83A14 of the BCEA and 200A of the LRA.15  These sections, according to Grogan,16 
creates a presumption that “regardless of the form of the contract, a person who 
                                                     
12
  Essential Labour Law 4
th
 ed (2004). 
13
  Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
14
  Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1993. 
15
  Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
16
  Workplace Law supra. 
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earns below a certain amount is an employee if that person is „subject to the control 
or direction of another person‟ or forms part of the employers‟ organisation, or who 
has worked for the other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month for the 
past three months, or is economically dependent on the other person, or works for 
only one person, or if the other person provides the tools of the trade”. 
 
As a result of the distinctiveness of a constructive dismissal it was necessary to 
define the terms, dismissal and employee.  Constructive dismissal, unlike the other 
forms of dismissal, is brought on as a result of the employee and not the employer 
bringing the employment contract to an end. It is defined in section 186(e) of the LRA 
and read as follows:  
 
- an employee terminates a contract of employment with or without notice 
because the employer made continued employment intolerable for the 
employee.17 
 
It is clear that this definition was designed to protect employees who resigned in 
desperation as they had no other option available and this situation was brought on 
the unfair, and sometimes unlawful, behaviour of the employer, which made 
continued employment intolerable.18 
 
2.2 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
The contract of employment is agreement under which an employer employs an 
employee.  Basson et al19 give an expanded definition,  
 
“The contract of employment is a voluntary agreement between two parties in terms 
of which one party (the employee) places his or her personal services or labour 
potential at the disposal and under the control of the other party (the employer) in 
exchange for some form of the remuneration which may include money and/or 
payments in kind.”  
 
                                                     
17
  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
18
  Jooste  v Transnet Ltd t/a SA Airways (1995) 16 ILJ 629 (LAC). 
19
  Basson et al Essential Labour Law supra. 
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There are numerous ways in which a contract of employment may be terminated, 
some of which are consensual and others that are unilateral.  For the purposes of 
this paper we are only concerned with the employee unilaterally terminating the 
contract of employment.  Prof Vettori20 believes that with this type of termination 
there is recourse under the common law, as well as under the LRA if it is found that 
the employee claims that he/she was constructively dismissed.    
 
Prof Vettori21 states that 
 
“in terms of the common law in England and South Africa, if there are circumstances 
that amount to a fundamental or repudiatory breach of contract by the employer, for 
example an employer unilaterally changes the essential nature of employment 
agreement by downgrading the employee‟s post or breaches a material term of the 
contract by not paying wages, the employee is entitled to cancel the contract and 
claim damages or compensation for the loss suffered as a result of the breach of 
contract”.   
 
This, she believes, results in constructive dismissal.  She goes on further to say that, 
“in circumstances where an employee resigns as a consequence of a breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence this often amounts to a constructive dismissal; 
however, if the employee resigns as a consequence of breaches of other material 
terms, such as failure to pay wages or a fundamental change to terms and 
conditions of employment such as a demotion, this can also amount to a constructive 
dismissal”.  
 
In Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots,22 Judge Nicholson reaffirms 
that a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence has been associated with 
the concept of constructive dismissal when he stated that, 
  
“The enquiry then becomes whether the appellant, without reasonable and proper 
cause, conducted itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee …” 
 
                                                     
20
  Constructive Dismissal and Repudiation of Contract: What must be Proved? (2011). 
21
  Supra. 
22
  [1997] 6 BLLR 721 (LAC). 
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This was later confirmed by Judge Cameron 23  when he stated that once the 
employee has proven that resignation was not voluntary “…the enquiry is whether 
the employer … had without reasonable or proper cause conducted itself in a 
manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee…”.  
 
Judge Cameron in Murray v Minister of Defence24 stated that constructive dismissal 
in terms of the common law and constructive dismissal based on the LRA should be 
interpreted the same, but the claims should be separate and distinct.  “The reason 
for this is the fact that the link between constructive dismissal under the LRA and the 
common law repudiation of contract has been severed and a new concept of 
constructive dismissal, unrelated to repudiation of contract, has been created in the 
common law in terms of the judgment in Murray v Minister of Defence”. 
 
This now gives employees a choice to base their claims either on constructive 
dismissal or repudiation of the contract, depending on the circumstances.  So if an 
employee cannot satisfy all the requirements to prove that he/she has been 
constructively dismissed for purposes of the LRA, they can then base a claim on the 
repudiation of the contract.  An example would be if an employee cannot prove that 
the employer was at fault, or that the employee has other options available to him 
other than resignation, or if the employee can prove that there was a repudiation of 
the contract but cannot prove that their work situation was intolerable, the best option 
would then be to base their claim on the common law repudiation of the contract.   
 
2.3 DEFINING THE CONCEPTS OF RESIGNATION, CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT, INTOLERABILITY 
 
A decision by the Labour Court in Lottering v Stellenbosch Municipality25 clearly 
spells out what constitutes a termination.  A resignation must be unequivocal and it 
takes effect when it is tendered, since it operates unilaterally, it does not require 
acceptance from the employer to become effective.  The contrary is also true, which 
                                                     
23
  Murray v Minister of Defence [2008] 3 All SA 66 (SCA). 
24
  Murray v Minister of Defence supra. 
25
  [2010] 12 BLLR 1306 (LC). 
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means that the employer is entitled to keep an employee to his resignation and the 
employee cannot retract his resignation without the employer‟s consent.  
 
For the purpose of constructive dismissal, a resignation means that there are 
circumstances where employees resign, not because they want to leave, but 
because the employer has created an intolerable working environment and as a 
result, the employee has no other choice but to resign.26  “These are also often 
referred to as „forced resignations‟.” 
 
The test for continued employment, as decided in Pretoria Society for the Care of the 
Retarded v Loots,27 is an objective one.  The concept of continued employment 
relates to the prospects or possibility of a continuation of the relationship that existed 
between the employee and the employer at the time that the contract was still intact. 
 
Grogan28 states that, “the requirement that the prospect of continued employment be 
intolerable … suggests that this form of dismissal should be confined to situations in 
which the employer behaved in a deliberate oppressive manner and left the 
employee with no option but to resign in order to protect his/her interests”.  An 
example would be where the employer behaved in such a manner that the employee 
had to see a psychiatrist and the psychiatrist found the employer‟s conduct to be the 
root cause for the employee‟s condition and subsequently recommends that the 
employee resigns to keep his/her own sanity.  
 
Intolerable is synonymous with unbearable, which ties in quite nicely with the 
definition given in Contemporary Labour Law.29  Here, the commissioner in Dawtrey 
and another v BBR Security (Pty) Ltd30 states that: 
 
“Generally speaking, the word „intolerable‟ as it appears in the Act connotes a wider 
ambit that conduct that involves a breach of contract or some form of coercion or 
duress. In this context, a fitting definition for intolerable is „not to be endured‟. 
                                                     
26
  Le Roux et al Contemporary Labour Law (2000). 
27
  (1997) 6 BLLR 721 (LAC). 
28
  Workplace Law supra. 
29
  Le Roux et al Contemporary Labour Law. 
30
  (1998) 7 CCMA 6.13.10. 
11 
Reverting to the Jooste case, the English approach as set out in Woods v WM Car 
Services accords with the principle of „conduct not to be endured‟ by using the 
analogous language of „conduct … that the employee cannot be expected to put up 
with‟. In other words, the employee could not reasonably be expected to endure the 
situation, regardless of the cause from which it originates, whether a contractual 
breach or otherwise.”     
  
12 
CHAPTER 3 
CASE LAW ON CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Constructive dismissal law was adopted to avoid exploitation, degradation, and to 
avoid situations where the employer makes the workplace an almost impossible 
place to work at.  But this also leads to employees resigning in rush to claim 
constructive dismissal or resign pending a disciplinary enquiry and then claim 
constructive dismissal.  As a result, it became very difficult to prove constructive 
dismissal.  The researcher will now look at different case law and judgments made to 
clear the concept of constructive dismissal.  
 
3.1.1 JOOSTE v TRANSNET LTD T/A SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS 
 
In this case Mr Jooste was employed by South African Airways (SAA) through 
Transnet Limited, which carries on business inter alia as SAA.  Mr Jooste 
commenced employment on 1 April 1992 and resigned on 23 February 1993.  He 
then later instituted proceedings against SAA in the industrial court in terms section 
43 of the Labour Relations Act, 28 of 1956.  He was successful and the court 
ordered that he be reinstated as he was unfairly constructively dismissed.  
 
The facts of the case indicate that soon after the appointment of Mr Jooste, he had a 
quarrel with his supervisor, Mr Kleinhans, who was very dissatisfied with his 
performance.  Mr Kleinhans, as a result, then took up some of Mr Jooste‟s duties 
which resulted in some of his subordinates reporting directly to Mr Kleinhans.  This 
was all sub-sequential to Mr Jooste getting bad reviews from his peer with regard to 
the operations of the cargo division of which Mr Jooste was in charge of.  Mr Jooste 
was of course very unhappy with what he called a unilateral change in his conditions 
of service/duties.  
 
 Some time later during his tenure at SAA, Mr Jooste rejected a severance package 
offered to him to leave employment of SAA.  Mr Kleinhans later advised Mr Jooste 
13 
again to accept the severance package and also his intention to dismiss him if he 
does not accept the package, but Mr Jooste again rejected the proposal.  
 
Mr Jooste lodged a grievance against Mr Kleinhans and some of the issues were the 
unilateral change in his duties; Kleinhans‟ communication directly with Jooste‟s 
subordinates, but never mentioned the threat to resign.  Before the grievance 
meeting could be attended to, Mr Kleinhans met with Mr Jooste to discuss his 
performance.  Near the end of this meeting Mr Jooste was advised that he would 
face a disciplinary enquiry as a result of a recent incident and again suggested that 
Mr Jooste accepts the retirement package.  This time Mr Jooste consulted both his 
wife and advisor and then decided to accept a severance package.  
 
The court‟s function was “to look at the employer‟s conduct as whole and determine 
whether it is such that its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that the 
employee cannot be expected to put up with it”.31  The court expressed that whilst Mr 
Kleinhans‟ action amounted to a repudiation of the contract, Mr Jooste opted to hold 
the employer to the contract.32  His resignation was not considered to be unilateral 
but rather pursuant to an agreement with Kleinhans.  The argument was not 
supported by the facts and accordingly he failed to discharge the onus of proving 
that he had not resigned voluntarily.  This basically means that an employee should 
not have planned on resigning and that he must be able to show that the resignation 
was not freely made but that it was caused by duress or some form of coercion.  
 
3.1.2 PRETORIA SOCIETY FOR THE CARE OF THE RETARDED v LOOTS  
 
Mrs Loots was employed by the Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded from 1 
April 1993 as an assistant manager of the Care division.  She had been employed to 
supervise twenty-six house mothers and was responsible for various administrative 
duties.  Mrs Loots then terminated her contract of employment on 21 October 1994 
and claimed constructive dismissal.  
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  Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a South African Airways (1995) 16 ILJ 629 (LAC). 
32
  Supra. 
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The background of this case indicates that Mrs Loots went on leave in September 
1993 and during this time her immediate supervisor, Theron, carried out her duties in 
her absence.  During this, Theron conducted enquiries to find out whether any 
employees who worked with Mrs Loots were unhappy with her.  Even though, at that 
stage there was nothing of substance against her, the employer started compiling a 
dossier against her.  
 
Mrs Loots was then placed on suspension pending a disciplinary enquiry, but during 
this time was refused access to the office in order to prepare for the enquiry.  She 
was then found guilty of charges relating to misconduct and poor work performance, 
and was subsequently sanctioned with a final written warning.  
 
When returning to work, Mrs Loots was denigrated by the employer in that he 
deprived her of her keys which had previously been in her possession, assumed 
some of her duties, and then published, in the employer‟s newsletter, Mrs Loots‟ final 
written warning without mentioning that she appealed against the sanction. 
 
Mrs Loots‟ health deteriorated and she visited two doctors who diagnosed her with 
tension and gastritis.  The employer doubted these diagnoses and required Mrs 
Loots to see a third doctor who diagnosed her with esophagitis and gastritis; both of 
which are stress related and caused by an overproduction of acid in the stomach.  
This doctor, who was insisted upon by the employer, confirmed that the only way in 
which she could properly recover her health was to remove the cause of her stress.33 
 
The Labour Appeal Court was convinced that on a balance of probabilities the stress 
was caused by the aggressive and hostile work environment created by the 
employer.34  The court found that that the employer engaged in a course of action in 
which Mrs Loots‟ resignation amounted to a constructive dismissal.  
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  Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots [1997] 6 BLLR 721 (LAC). 
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  Supra. 
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3.1.3 VAN DER RIET v LEISURENET LTD T/A HEALTH & RACQUET CLUB  
 
Mr Van der Riet was employed full time at one of Leisurenet‟s health clubs as a floor 
instructor in 1990.  He advanced through the ranks until he finally got promoted to 
regional manager in Gauteng.  In this position he had overall responsibility for the 
operations of a number of health clubs.  Mr Van der Riet then resigned from his 
employment on 15 August 1995 because the employer made continuous 
employment intolerable.  
 
Leisurenet had undergone restructuring. For the purposes of this case, however, it is 
important to understand how the previous structure was set up.  In the previous 
structure there were the health club managers reporting to their respective regional 
managers, regional staff reporting to the regional managers, and all regional 
managers reporting to the group operations manager.  
 
Leisurenet‟s restructuring occurred during August 1995 which saw a new post, that 
of regional manager, being created for each region.  This then saw a former regional 
manager being promoted to the new post of regional general manager in the 
Gauteng area.  This meant that the regional manager would no longer report directly 
to the group operations manager, but rather to the new regional general manager.  
Therefore, in effect, Mr Van der Riet now had to report to a superior in a position 
lower than the one to which he had previously reported to.   
 
The court expressed its acceptance that the employer had a real and genuine 
commercial reason for restructuring its business, but it also found that Mr Van der 
Riet was never consulted and, because of unproved suspicions of his non-
performance, he was overlooked for promotion within the new structure.  The court 
found this to be sufficient grounds to justify Mr Van der Riet‟s resignation.  The 
Labour Appeal Court found that the constructive dismissal was both substantially 
and procedurally unfair.     
 
  
16 
3.1.4 HAWORTH v QUIGNEY SPAR AND ANOTHER  
 
Mrs Haworth was employed as a deli assistant at Quigney Kwik Spar in November 
1999.  Her main duties were assisting customers, cleaning the deli and packing 
stock.  An incident happened on 28 June 2000 that left Mrs Haworth with no option 
but to repudiate the contract of employment.  In this incident the employer, not only 
verbally abused Mrs Haworth, but also threatened her.  
 
Mrs Haworth was unhappy with her working hours as well as her rate of pay, and, as 
a result, contacted the Department of Manpower to investigate.  Immediately after 
the visit from the Department of Manpower to the store, the employer spoke to Mrs 
Haworth in front of many people and asked her if she was unhappy about her 
working hours and rate of pay.  Mrs Haworth answered in the affirmative.  
 
The employer then responded by saying, “I have a f%$ problem with you.  For your 
type, I don‟t have time.  You are a f%$ piece of scum. I can tell you now, your time at 
Spar won‟t be much longer.  You can run back to them now and tell them I‟m 
threatening you”.35  Sometime later as Mrs Haworth was about to go on lunch, the 
employer stuck his keys in her mouth and said, “Try and send people after me again.  
I‟ll f%$ show you what I‟ll do to you”.  He then also went on further to state that it 
would be a surprise if Mrs Haworth was at the Deli by the end of the day as he would 
see to it that she would be mopping floors.  
 
The CCMA in this case found Mrs Haworth‟s constructive dismissal to be unfair.  The 
commissioner believed that the employer created an unbearable situation for the 
employee and that there was no possibility that the employer would reform and 
abandon his ways.  The commissioner stated further that it cannot be expected of 
the employee to put up with the employer‟s conduct and that there was no other form 
of relief available to the employee but to repudiate her contract.  
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3.1.5 HICKMAN v TSATSIMPE NO & OTHERS       
 
Mr Hickman‟s designation at Tsatsimpe was that of a Director with a 25.5% 
shareholder stake in the company.  Mr Hickman called for a strategy meeting where 
he hoped his concerns about the running of the company would be addressed.  
Instead, the other directors used this meeting to express their unhappiness with Mr 
Hickman as a shareholder and director.  Following this meeting, Mr Hickman 
resigned on 1 February 2008, and claimed constructive dismissal.  
 
By his own concession, some of the issues that led to the resignation are as 
follows:36 
 
1. The company failed to regularise or to comply with the legal requirements 
when it installed a certain fibre optic line in order to carry voice traffic for 
clients.  It needed to secure connectivity to various other companies in the 
form of Telkom lines to provide a bandwidth to be able to do this.  The 
applicant alleges that this was illegally installed.  This was a situation that 
existed from 1 August 2007.  
 
2. It failed to resolve problems of outsourced contracts under Gregory Wilson‟s 
management, and that warranties on equipment sold by the third respondent 
had not been secured by back-to-back agreements with Three Dot Com.  
 
3. It recorded in the strategy meeting minutes of 25 January 2008 that the 
applicant no longer has a role in the company as a director and shareholder 
and that he has not been performing his role in this regard, and that the other 
directors do not believe that he would ever fulfil a meaningful role in the 
company. 
 
It is very interesting to note that, at the time of his resignation, Mr Hickman was 
facing charges of misconduct in a pending disciplinary hearing.  Mr Hickman also 
never previously lodged any grievance or complaint before his resignation.  The 
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Labour Court found that the illegal conduct of Tsatsimpe was not directed at Mr 
Hickman in order to coerce him into resigning, but rather that Mr Hickman resigned 
to avoid possible disciplinary proceedings.  The court therefore ruled that he had not 
been constructively dismissed.  
 
3.1.6 MEHTA v SEKUNJALO INVESTMENTS LTD & ANOTHER  
 
Mr Metha was a Chief Executive Officer at Sekunjalo Corporate Services (Pty) Ltd.  
During restructuring, Mr Metha concluded an “executive contract of employment” 
where he was appointed as an Executive Director reporting to the CEO of Sekunjalo 
Investments Ltd.  His employment was deemed to have commenced on 1 
September 2007.  Mr Metha claimed that continued employment became intolerable, 
and subsequently resigned on 10 December 2007.  
 
It is apparent that the alleged intolerable conditions were brought about by an e-mail 
Surve, the chairman of the Sekunjalo group as well as letter from Kajee, the CEO of 
the Sekunjalo group.  The e-mail from Surve was sent to express his mere 
disappointment with the October financial results of Sekunjalo Health Care and 
Sekpharma.  Surve also advised that Kajee would be taking over from him as Group 
CEO.  The court in this case believes that Surve was entitled to send this e-mail and 
that it did not form part of any unreasonable and/or unfair conduct by the employer.  
The court could not see how this could have possibly made the employment 
relationship intolerable.  
 
The letter from Kajee on 17 November 2007 assigns some blame for the bad 
performance on Sekpharma in October 2007 to Mr Mehta.  In the same letter, 
however, he comes up with recommendations on how to fix the problem.  Because 
Kajee had, at the time, recently taken over from Surve as CEO, the Court said that 
Kajee was entitled, if not obliged, to make Mr Metha aware of the poor performance 
of Sekpharma.  Here the court once again stated that Kajee‟s letter could not have 
been regarded as unreasonable and/or unfair conduct by the employer, nor was 
there an intention to force the employee into resigning.  
19 
 
The court stated that37 
 
“An overall conspectus of the evidence adduced in this matter does not show that the 
employer‟s conduct, judged objectively, was unreasonable and/or unfair, nor does it 
show that the employment relationship should be ended. The employee furthermore 
failed to exhaust the remedies which were available to him at the time of his 
resignation, and the said resignation was clearly not an option of last resort. In the 
circumstances, it is plain that the constructive dismissal contended for by the 
employee was devoid of substance, and he failed to discharge the onus on him to 
prove that the employer‟s conduct rendered continued employment intolerable.”   
 
3.1.7 ASARA WINE ESTATE AND HOTEL (PTY) LTD v VAN ROOYEN AND 
OTHERS (2012) 33 ILJ 363 
 
Mr Jan van Rooyen was employed by the applicant Asara Wine Estate and Hotel 
(Pty) Ltd as its winemaker. 38   The applicant‟s business is situated just outside 
Stellenbosch and carries on its business as a wine form and upmarket hotel. It sells 
its wines locally and internationally.  The applicant prides itself with its leading wine, 
the Bell Tower which is a five-way Bordeaux blend and also a regular prize winner.  
 
Mr Van Rooyen who lived in a house on the estate, was responsible for the prize 
winning wine, the Bell Tower and other wines, including the Ebony range.  In 2009 
the applicant received a complaint from an irritated German customer who 
purchased approximately 12 000 bottles of the Asara Ebony, that was oxidised.  The 
owner, Mr Rahmann then took this issue up with Mr Van Rooyen in trying to come up 
with an appropriate action to be taken against Mr Van Rooyen as a result of this.  
These discussions took place over a few days.  This then resulted in Mr Van Rooyen 
acquiring legal advice. 
 
Mr Van Rooyen‟s attorney then forwarded a letter to the employer stating that his 
client, Mr Van Rooyen was given an ultimatum by Mr Rahmann “to either accept a 
severance package equal to payment to the end of August 2009, or to face summary 
dismissal for gross misconduct and/or professional negligence”.  The employer‟s 
attorney then responded to Mr Van Rooyen‟s attorney by saying that they denied Mr 
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20 
Van Rooyen‟s version of events and that Rahmann had told Mr Van Rooyen that he 
could no longer trust him as the estate‟s winemaker and that he discussed three 
alternatives with Mr Van Rooyen, which was:  
 
“1. The estate will follow a disciplinary procedure which may very well result in Mr 
Van Rooyen‟s dismissal;   
2.  They schedule a pre-dismissal arbitration with the CCMA;  
3.  Alternative to the above, Mr Van Rooyen could submit a proposal to Mr 
Rahmann on how the issue should be resolved.”
39 
 
The letter further stated that Mr Van Rooyen was suspended on full pay, pending an 
enquiry into his conduct and performance.  
 
On 25 July 2009 Mr Van Rooyen resigned before any formal disciplinary charges 
were laid against him.  Mr Van Rooyen then claimed to have been constructively 
dismissed as he claims that it was put to him that he resigned or face charges.  He 
then also remained in occupation of the house on the farm until 31 August 2009.  
 
The Labour Court said that in this case there is an obvious dispute of fact as to what 
transpired in the discussions between Rahmann and Van Rooyen.40  Mr Van Rooyen 
claimed that he was given an ultimatum to resign or face legal action, whilst 
Rahmann testified that Mr Van Rooyen was given three options, namely: 
 
(a)  an investigation into the affair; 
(b)  pre-dismissed arbitration before the CCMA; or 
(c)  Van Rooyen could propose an alternative solution. 
 
The court then said on either version of events, it was clear that Mr Van Rooyen was 
aware that he had an alternative to resignation, ie he could have faced disciplinary 
charges.  The court went on further to say that Mr Van Rooyen‟s resignation was 
premature and could not be construed as a constructive dismissal.  It was 
subsequently found that Mr Van Rooyen was not dismissed but resigned voluntary.  
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3.2  CONCLUSION 
 
The above mentioned cases outline how our courts have dealt with claims of 
constructive dismissal. It shows how the courts have protected employees against 
exploitation, degradation and situations where the workplace has become an 
unbearable place to work at, but it also shows the courts won‟t be fooled to side with 
the party that resigns in a rush and wants to claim constructive dismissal. 
 
In the first two landmark cases of Jooste and Pretoria Society for the Retarded the 
courts reached 2 very important aspects of constructive dismissal and these were 
that the resignation should be a unilateral act and not an agreement as well as the 
fact that the employers‟ conduct should not be looked in isolation but rather as a 
whole to be proof that the conduct was intolerable. 
 
The Van der Riet case highlights the fact that even though the employer had a real 
business rational for the intolerable situation that was created by its restructuring, it 
doesn‟t exempt the employer from consulting with the employee.  The Haworth case 
shows that in that case the employees‟ intolerable situation was not just a mere 
unhappiness with her employer but believed that an intolerable situation was created 
by the employer and the court added that there was no indication that the employer 
would reform and abandon his ways. 
 
The court stated in the Hickman case that at the time of the resignation, he was 
facing disciplinary charges and the court ruled that the resignation was not as a 
result of intolerable circumstances but rather as a measure to avoid disciplinary 
action.  In the Mehta case the court opined that because the employee failed to 
exhaust the remedies which were available to him at the time of his resignation, 
which meant that the resignation was not a last resort which failed the test for 
constructive dismissal. 
 
The recent case of Asara Wine Estate, the court made it quite clear that the 
employee claiming constructive dismissal should be coerced to resign and not as in 
this case, resign voluntary. The fact that the employer gave the employee 3 different 
22 
options to choose from, makes it clear that the resignation was premature and other 
courses of action was possible. The judge stated that there must be no reasonable 
alternatives. He went on to say that arbitration decisions still take into account the 
failure to exhaust internal procedures as indicative that intolerability has not been 
reached. 
 
In summary then a constructive dismissal will entail a situation of intolerability, 
brought about by the employer and from which there is no alternative but to resign. It 
is clear that the courts have covered critical aspects of constructive dismissals 
claims and dealt with them in a correct and appropriate manner. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
 
4.1  MURRAY v MINISTER OF DEFENCE (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA) 
 
Mr Murray joined the South African Defense Force as a petty officer, after he served 
nine years in the South African Police.  He soon rose to the rank of commander and 
he was the officer in charge of the Simonstown military police station.  He was not 
only the most senior policeman but also the only commissioned military police officer 
in the force.  He was also frequently praised for his commitment, dedication and 
managerial ability that accompanied performance bonuses year after year.41 
 
In 1992, the relationship between Murray and his employer turned sour after 
members of Murray‟s units laid accusations against him that led to a number of 
investigations and court-martial.  Despite the fact that none of the allegations 
culminated in any serious adverse finding, Mr Murray was still removed from his post 
at Simonstown and declined to reinstate him.42 
 
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), during the time that the conflict 
between Mr Murray and his subordinates arose, was embarking on a restructuring 
exercise which resulted in Mr Murray‟s position as head of Military police station at 
Simonstown being downgraded.  After the removal of Mr Murray from his post, a 
officer of junior rank to Murray was appointed to this position.43 
 
Mr Murray was then offered a senior position in Pretoria which he rejected.  The 
SANDF did not explain any of the details of this position to Mr Murray nor did Mr 
Murray enquire about the details of the position before rejecting it. 
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Seven months after Mr Murray was offered the position, he resigned, claiming that 
because of the SANDF‟s “continual unfair an ill-treatment” of him over the preceding 
two and a half years left him with no other alternative.44 
 
The common-law test for constructive dismissal fell away when section 186(1)(e) of 
the LRA firmly recognized this type of dismissal, but it is common cause the LRA 
excludes or does not apply to certain categories of employees of  which the National 
Defence Force forms part of, hence Mr Murray could not rely on this section of the 
law.  Fortunately a claim for an unfair constructive dismissal may be found in statute 
or in the common law.45 
 
Because Mr Murray could not rely on the LRA, he referred a claim for unfair 
constructive dismissal under the common law to the High Court.  The court, after a 
delay of sixteen months delivered a judgment that found the employment relationship 
had not broken down irretrievably, and that none of Mr Murray‟s complaints, weighed 
individually, had rendered the employment relationship intolerable or caused him to 
resign.  The court then dismissed the claim with costs, including the costs of the two 
counsels.46 
 
Unhappy with the decision of the High Court, Murray decided to refer the matter to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the parties agreed 
that because Murray, as a member of the SANDF, is expressly excluded from the 
LRA, they could rely directly on section 23(1) of the Bill of Rights that provides that 
“everyone has the right to fair labour practices”.  In his opening remarks judge 
Cameron said the following: 
 
“It is in my view best to understand the impact of these rights on this case through the 
constitutional development of the common law contract of employment.  This contract 
has always imposed mutual obligations of confidence and trust between employer 
and employee.  Developed as it must be to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights, the common law of employment must be held to impose on all 
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employers a duty of fair dealing at all times with their employees – even those the 
LRA does not cover.”
47 
  
This statement is based on section 8(3) of the constitution that states that the courts 
are required to give effect to the Bill of Rights and must develop the common laws to 
give effect to fundamental rights where legislation fails to do so.  Cameron held 
further that the contract of employment in South Africa had an implied term that the 
employer would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a 
manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage this relationship of 
confidence and trust with the employee.  Such a breach would then amount to a 
contractual repudiation justifying the employee in resigning and claiming 
compensation for dismissal. 
  
Graig Bosch 48  in his article, Bent out of Shape, raised an important issue and 
criticizes the Supreme Court of Appeal in its reasoning for allowing a constructive 
dismissal claim under the constitutionally developed common law.  He criticizes the 
acceptance of the request by Murray, that the common law should be developed in a 
manner that recognizes a claim for constructive dismissal.  It is clear that the court 
virtually applied the same principles for a constructive dismissal under the common 
law as for that under the LRA.  The problem with this is that the common law does 
not know anything of “dismissal” which is defined in section 186(1) of the LRA.  It is 
rather familiar or governs breaches and/or terminations of the contract of 
employment.  Bosch believes that even though it might seem pedantic, it is still an 
important part of maintaining what should be a very real divide between the common 
law and the LRA. 
 
This is a very important distinction if one considers that it is so much easier to 
succeed with a claim based on the employer‟s alleged repudiation of the contract as 
appeal to having to prove intolerability.  The Labour Court in Mafomane v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 49  made it abundantly clear that constructive 
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dismissal and the repudiation of the contract are not synonymous.  The court stated 
that “codification of the concept of constructive dismissal under the LRA has 
amongst other things severed the link between constructive dismissal and wrongful 
repudiation of a contract at common law. It is now statutory concept in its own right 
which does not need to retain its link to the common-law doctrine of wrongful 
repudiation for its justification”. 
 
Be as it may, in the Murray case the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that it is 
no longer necessary under the constitutionally - developed common law to refer to 
concepts such as repudiation.  The overarching consideration is the requirement that 
employers make decisions affecting employees fairly.  The SCA formulated the test 
for constructive dismissal under the common law which relies on the same principles 
developed by the labour courts and reads as follows: 
 
“The employee must prove that the resignation was not voluntary, and that it was not 
intended to terminate the employment relationship. Once this is established, the 
inquiry is whether the employer (irrespective of any intention to repudiate the contract 
of employment) had without reasonable and proper cause conducted itself in a 
manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust with the employee. Looking at the employer‟s conduct as a 
whole and in its cumulative impact, the courts have asked in such cases whether its 
effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, was such that the employee could not be 
expected to put up with it.”
50 
 
The court also made it clear that the intolerable circumstances must have been of 
the employer‟s making and the employer must be culpably responsible for the 
intolerable conditions under which the employee was working, which means that the 
employer‟s conduct must have lacked reasonable and proper cause.  So the issue 
becomes that the court had to determine whether the SANDF made Murray‟s 
position intolerable and if this was the case, whether the SANDF acted fairly in doing 
so.51 
 
Judge Cameron in assessing Murray‟s case pointed out that Murray endured 
hardship during the investigations into his conduct and the two court-martials he 
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faced.  His last years in the SANDF were truly miserable and despite all the steps 
taken against him, he still came out of all of it formally cleared.  Judge Cameron also 
found Murray to be an honourable man who became burdened by his sense of 
grievance against the SANDF.  However, in most respects of Murray‟s employment, 
the management thereof was substantially fair.52 
 
Cameron53  stated the SANDF dealt fairly with all but one issue which was the 
SANDF‟s response to the resulting operational conundrum.  Murray was offered a 
job at HQ in Pretoria as SSO protection services.  As mentioned earlier, Murray 
made no serious effort to investigate the ambit and responsibilities of the job, but 
declined it on advice from his superior at the staff college, Smith.  Murray then 
declined the offer as he suspected that he was being set up, and convinced that the 
job would lie outside his capabilities. 
 
As much as this was an error by Murray, the bigger error was committed by the 
SANDF, Cameron believed.  He commented that the SADF made no effort to explain 
the job to Murray, to illuminate its parameters and challenges, and to engage him in 
a process that would enable him to consider it properly.  He went on to say that the 
SANDF‟s decision not to return Murray to his post presented it with a classic 
reorganization or rationalization problem.  Given the outcome of both court-martials, 
the decision not to return him to his post involved no fault on Murray‟s part.  In 
circumstances, Cameron states that the law clearly places a duty on the employer to 
consult fully with the employee affected and to share information to enable him to 
make informed decisions.  The SANDF did not fulfil this responsibility until after 
Murray resigned.54 
 
Cameron elaborated by saying that an explanation of the job offer was anything but 
superfluous.  He states that “the job the navy (SANDF) proposed for the plaintiff 
(Murray) was an entirely new position, carved out from a previous post that 
embraced both „protection services‟ and „amphibious warfare‟ ”.  Navy staff referred 
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colloquially to the old post simply as “SSO protection services”.  The plaintiff thought 
his new duties would embraced amphibious warfare, for which he had neither 
suitable qualification nor inclination.  Even though Murray‟s assumption was incorrect, 
Cameron believed it to be both understandable and reasonable and the SANDF 
never put him right nor did they make any effort to ensure that he knew what was 
being offered, or what it would require of him. 
 
It became apparent that the SANDF was prepared to offer Murray the benefit of what 
Du Toit called “a bit of cross training” as well as the benefit of head office support 
who was willing as Du Toit expressed it to hold his hand for a while.  Unfortunately 
Murray knew some of this and no effort was made to communicate it to him.  It is 
true that Murray walked out of the meeting with Du Toit without taking matters further 
and even though Du Toit would have mentioned all these options to Murray at this 
meeting, Cameron said that in the circumstances that prevailed, the SANDF was in 
fairness not entitled to sit back and let matters stall there.  Cameron goes on further 
to state that given the background of management decisions (albeit operationally 
justified) that had brought the employment relationship to that impasse; it had a duty 
in fairness to do more.55 
 
Cameron said that Murray‟s subjective condition of suspicion, demoralization and 
depression, which was evident to those dealing with him, made it more materially 
relevant that the SANDF deals fairly with him.  His condition meant that an 
unexplainable offer of a new post was likely to be rejected.  The lack of explanation, 
follow-up and elucidation did not constitute fair dealing. 
 
According to Cameron had the SANDF adequately and fairly explained the post to 
Murray, and the back-up it offered, his position would not have been intolerable, as 
Murray certainly was consistent in expressing his wish and determination to stay in 
the navy, though on just terms.  Its failure to do so meant that the operating cause of 
Murray‟s resignation was the SANDF‟s injury and in an intolerable position in his 
employment, both because of the SANDF‟s conduct. 
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Cameron56 argues that the correspondence makes it clear, as does Murray‟s lengthy 
“redress of wrongs‟ affidavit, which he penned after his resignation, that he 
considered himself simultaneously entitled to compensation for injury and in an 
intolerable position in his employment, both because of the SANDF‟s conduct.  The 
SANDF‟s refusal to compensate him resulted in a statement.  Murray did not forfeit 
his claim because he was intent on being compensated, and decided that therefore 
he had no alternative but to resign. 
 
The appeal, accordingly, had to be upheld.  The order of the court a quo was set 
aside and replaced with an order declaring that Murray was entitled to such 
compensation as he might prove for his constructive dismissal by the SANDF.  The 
SANDF was also ordered to pay the costs, including the costs of two counsels.57 
 
Reverting back to the criticism laid down by Bosch on the Murray case, he 
comments on the outcome of this judgment that “ironically, an argument in favour of 
having the common law emulate the LRA‟s approach to constructive dismissal might 
come from employers”. If it is accepted that proving intolerability is in most cases 
more difficult than proving repudiation or material breach, employers might argue 
that in order to achieve the balance required by the right to fair labour practices 
between their interests and those of the employee the court must require an 
employee to demonstrate intolerability in order to prove constructive dismissal.  That 
is reinforced if one considers that a damage claim under the common law is not 
capped in the same manner as a claim for compensation under the LRA.  He 
believes that would arguably facilitate the balance required by the right to fair labour 
practices.58        
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CHAPTER 5 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
Grogan59 states that one of the three principal duties of an employer is to ensure that 
working conditions are safe and healthy.  An employer would not be fulfilling its 
duties if their employees get sexually harassed.  Every employee has the right to be 
treated with dignity and respect in the workplace, and employees do not have to 
tolerate harassment in any form.  
 
5.1 SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
The International Labour Organisation 60  reports that sexual harassment, a 
manifestation of sex-based discrimination, has become a growing concern at a 
national and international level.  It is a common cause that women have been 
marginalised in South Africa, which makes the eradication of sexual harassment in 
the workplace an even more pertinent issue.  The ILO defines sexual harassment as 
a sex-based behaviour that is unwelcome and offensive to its recipient.  It is also 
commonly referred to as unwanted conduct of a sexual nature.  
  
Sexual harassment in the workplace may take on two forms.  The first of these are 
known as quid pro quo and it is normally when a job benefit, such as a pay raise, a 
promotion, or even continued employment is made on a condition that the employee 
who receives these benefits should accede to demands to engage in some form of 
sexual behaviour.  
 
The other form in which it may manifest is where a hostile environment is created 
where the working conditions are intimidating or humiliating for the victim.  Sexual 
harassment behaviour can manifest physically, verbally and non-verbally.  Physically 
in the form of physical violence, touching, unnecessary close proximity; verbally in 
the form of comments and questions about appearance, life-style, sexual orientation, 
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offensive phone calls; and non-verbal in the form of whistling, sexual suggestive 
gestures, and display of sexual materials. 
 
In the case of Christian v Colliers Properties61 the employee, Ms Christian, referred a 
sexual harassment dispute to the CCMA.  Ms Christian was appointed as a typist 
and two days after she started, the owner of the business asked her if she had a 
boyfriend and invited her to dinner.  He also invited her to sit on his lap and kissed 
her on the neck.  When she later objected to the owner‟s conduct, he asked her 
whether she was “in or out”.  When she said that she was “not in”, he asked her why 
he should allow her employment to continue.  
 
Ms Christian was then dismissed with two days‟ pay.  It was then found that Ms 
Christian was dismissed for refusing the owner‟s advances and this constituted an 
automatically unfair dismissal based on sexual discrimination.  Ms Christian was 
awarded 24 months‟ remuneration in compensation.  The difficulty is that not all 
employees that are sexually harassed will be dismissed.  So if continued sexual 
harassment makes continued employment intolerable, the employee subjected to the 
harassment has the option of resigning and approaching the CCMA or bargaining 
councils.  
 
5.2 SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES / CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
Within the employment sphere an employee has two remedies available to them 
when encountered by sexual harassment.  One resides in the Employment Equity 
Act, 62 section 6(1) which reads “no person may unfairly discriminate, directly and 
indirectly, against an employee … on one or more grounds including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy…”.  
 
Section 6(3) goes on to say that “harassment of an employee is a form of unfair 
discrimination and is prohibited on any one or a combination of ground of unfair 
discrimination listed in subsection (1)”.    
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The second remedy available to an employee lies within section 186(e) of the Labour 
Relations Act.63  This becomes an option when an employee can no longer endure 
the harassment and terminates the employment contract in circumstance where the 
employer‟s conduct becomes intolerable or unreasonable.  When an employee 
terminates the employment relationship by means of resignation and this resignation 
is as a result of the employer‟s unlawful or improper conduct such as sexual 
harassment, it will constitute grounds for dismissal.  
 
We will now look at what happens when continued sexual harassment makes 
continued employment impossible and the employee resigns and refers a claim of 
constructive dismissal to the CCMA or a bargaining council.  
   
5.2.1 PAYTEN v PREMIER CHEMICALS 
 
In Payten v Premier Chemicals,64 the applicant (Ms Sharon Louise Payten) was 
employed as a receptionist at the Cape Town premises of the respondent (Premier 
Chemicals) on 25 June 1998.  The applicant terminated her contract of employment 
on 4 January 1999 as a result of an incident that took place on 11 December 1998, 
which made continued employment intolerable.  
 
This all started off with the company‟s Christmas function being replaced by a braai 
on site.  This was decided by the applicant‟s immediate superior and local manager, 
Ranger.  At this braai, the men were all at the bar having drinks, while the ladies 
were all downstairs, not drinking.  Ranger called the applicant to come upstairs to 
butter the rolls in the kitchen.  The applicant then went to the bar and accepted a 
soda water while the men were busy drinking.  
 
When the applicant entered the bar, the topic of conversation was that her colleague, 
Engelbrecht, was given money to buy what was described as a “Wonder Bra”.  She 
would wear it and show it off to the men.  The applicant was then asked by the two 
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men, Wallish and Miller, to show them her bra.  She left the office and was on her 
way downstairs when one of the men, Wallish, pushed her into the ladies toilet and 
tried to push her top garment up as he wanted her to show him her bra.  She then 
fended him off and walked downstairs where she warned Engelbrecht that Wallish 
was still on about the bra.  The applicant and the other two ladies stayed in the 
offices with snacks and drinks, but were called out by Ranger to join the party 
outside.  After being called for again, the applicant later went outside.  
 
The applicant went to the training room where she found Ranger, Miller and Kinnear 
standing around drinking.  When Wallish arrived on the scene they forcefully 
removed her t-shirt and further untied her bra whilst trying to nibble at her breast and 
then they were trying to pull down her shorts.  The commissioner in this case 
concurred with the applicant‟s attorney that this behaviour falls within paragraph 
(4)(1)(b) of the Code of Good Practice on Sexual Harassment which reads, 
  
“Verbal forms of sexual harassment include unwelcome innuendos, suggestions, and 
hints, sexual advances, comments with sexual overtones, … unwelcome and 
inappropriate enquiries about a person‟s sex life, and unwelcome whistling at a 
person or group of persons.” 
 
On 4 January when the applicant went to go see Ranger about the incident, he was 
intent on damage control.  The commissioner stated that “although she did not make 
use of any formal grievance procedures, she did report the incident to at least two 
senior persons in the company and it is clear that enquiries were made.  Such 
enquiries were, however, apparently, of an informal nature in which Ranger was 
merely asked for his version and no effort was made to make an in-depth 
investigation into the allegations.  It would appear that the company did not wish to 
take responsibility for what had happened in Cape Town.  That approach is also 
suggested by the apparent lack of interest in these proceedings, suggested by the 
failure to send its Industrial Relations incumbent, who had been referred to, to attend 
it”. 
 
The commissioner went on to say that the respondent must be faulted, not only for 
the failure of Ranger to take appropriate action on the day, but its subsequent failure 
34 
to comply with the Code of Good Practice relating to sexual harassment, with its 
failure to institute a formal investigation.  
 
“By not first approaching the complaint with the necessary sensitivity demanded by 
the Code of Good Practice and properly investigating it, it seems to me that the 
respondent was vexatious in the pursuance of its cause in that it unfairly resulted in 
what was, substantially, and unwarranted attack on the integrity of the applicant 
during these proceedings, causing her further emotional distress.”  In this matter the 
commissioner concluded by awarding the maximum compensation contemplated by 
the Act.   
 
5.2.2 GERBER v ALGORAX (PTY) LTD 
 
The applicant, Mr Gerber, was employed as a quality assurance manager at Algorax.  
He was dismissed on 21 July 1998 by the respondent, Algorax (Pty) Ltd, after being 
found guilty of sexual harassment.  The applicant referred a dispute of unfair 
dismissal, claiming that he never committed the acts complained about and even if it 
were to be established that he did so, sanction of dismissal was to too severe.65 
 
This is all following an incident involving the applicant and a contract worker, Mrs 
Newman who reported to the applicant.  One day the applicant remarked that Ms 
Newman looked sexy and she was offended by this.  On one occasion she 
approached the applicant for permission to take leave and the applicant‟s response 
was that she could do so provided that she gave him a kiss and even before she 
could respond, the applicant forcibly grabbed her and kissed her.  
 
Ms Newman testified that on 11 June 1998, whilst sitting in her office, the applicant 
stroked both her thighs and buttocks.  He then requested a cup of coffee and when 
she returned to her office with a cup of coffee in each hand, the applicant 
approached her from behind and touched her sides, stomach and breasts, also in 
stroking fashion.  She was upset by the applicant‟s conduct and requested Mr Van 
Vuuren, a production co-ordinator, to accompany her to her office.  The applicant 
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then proceeded to stroke her hair and shoulders and she showed her disapproval by 
moving forward in her seat.  
 
Ms Newman also testified that the applicant also remarked that he wished to take 
her into the Carbon Plant “without protective clothing as carbon black went 
everywhere and he wished to see where everywhere was”.  He also referred to the 
fact that carbon black would result in her panty line becoming visible.  
 
It is also clear that Ms Newman immediately reacted by berating Mr Cheetham for 
not coming to her assistance (a network consultant of a microcare computer services 
at the time) as he overheard the gist of the applicant‟s comment.  She stated that 
she was deeply upset and traumatised by the applicant‟s conduct and that it had a 
significant effect on her personal life.  She in fact terminated her contract with the 
respondent as a direct result of the applicant‟s misconduct.  
 
Even though this is not a constructive dismissal as a result of sexual harassment 
case, is it clear that had Ms Newman referred such a case to the CCMA, she would 
have succeeded with a claim of constructive dismissal on the basis that she was 
sexually harassed by a manager of her employer.  It is clear that as a result of the 
applicant‟s conduct, Ms Newman resigned and therefore on the face of the evidence 
had adequate reason.  It seems that the applicant in this instance had on a regular 
basis been sexually harassing subordinate female staff for some time.  
 
The judge concluded that by saying that the applicant‟s conduct constituted a serious 
form of sexual harassment.  His conduct caused great unhappiness and led to the 
resignation of staff.  He went on to say that it is his view that there is every reason for 
the respondent to mistrust the applicant with other female employees.  He held the 
sanction of dismissal to be fair and reasonable.  
 
This is a significant case that shows victims of sexual harassment in the workplace, 
that perpetrators will pay the consequences of their actions if victims report such 
actions and act strongly without fear of losing one‟s job.   
 
  
36 
5.2.3 NTSABO v REAL SECURITY CC 
 
In this case the applicant, Ntsabo, alleged that she had been seriously sexually 
harassed and the respondent, Real Security, denies all such claims.66  The applicant 
said that during the latter part of 1999 she was harassed by her supervisor.  He 
touched her breasts, thighs, buttocks, and ultimately, as the court puts it, simulated a 
sexual act on her resulting in his ejaculating on her shirt.  The court said that she 
underwent a change of character as a result of the harassment.  Such was the 
seriousness of the impact on the employee‟s health.  She then eventually resigned 
and claimed an automatically unfair constructive dismissal relating to discrimination.  
 
What makes this a very interesting case is the conclusion reached by the court in 
determining the dispute and the order.  The court held that from the perspective of 
the Labour Relations Act, the employee‟s dismissal could not be described as being 
based on discrimination.  Discrimination was not alleged as a basis for 
dissatisfaction and consequent resignation and therefore she failed with a claim for 
automatically unfair constructive dismissal.  The court, however, had no problem with 
a claim for constructive dismissal.  
 
“In the circumstances, it is clear that the inaction of the respondent was unfair and 
lead to a situation that became an intolerable environment for the applicant to 
continue employment. She was then compelled to terminate her contract of 
employment with the respondent. The respondent did or at least ought to have 
foreseen the development of hostile and intolerable working environment in the 
circumstances. The respondent did not explain its approach and chose to deny that it 
was ever informed of the problem. It follows therefore by the nature of its defence, it 
did not prove that the dismissal fair. Her action therefore falls within the situation as 
envisaged by section 186(e) of the LRA.” 
 
The interesting part came when awarding damages.  One of the claims made by the 
employee related to future medical expenses (treatment for depression).  The court 
held that, “section 50 of the Employment Equity Act does not specifically provide for 
such an order.  The EEA, however, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court.  The Labour Court of South Africa is founded on the provisions of the 
LRA.  Consequently the powers accorded to the Labour Court by the LRA must have 
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force over all other legislation with which the Labour Court deals, unless specifically 
excluded”.  The court believed that section 50 of the EEA is not exhaustive.  
 
The court held that the employer‟s failure to take action in respect of the sexual 
harassment does not “provide a veil behind which an employer can hide to avoid 
possible liability”.  The employer was then held liable for damages which flowed from 
the sexual harassment perpetrated by the employee.  
 
The most interesting fact about this case is how the jurisdiction of the Labour Court 
in terms of the LRA was transferred to its jurisdiction and powers in terms of the EEA 
in spite of the fact that the Labour Court was established in terms of the LRA.  
 
5.2.4 CHRISTIAN v COLLIERS PROPERTIES 
 
In Christian v Colliers Properties,67 the court stated that, 
 
“the objective of an award for unlawful racial discrimination is restitution. For the 
injury to feelings, for the humiliation, for the insult, it is impossible to say what is 
restitution and the answer must depend on the experience and good sense of the 
judge and his assessors. Awards should not be minimal, because this would tend to 
trivialise or diminish respect for the public policy to which the Act gives effect. On the 
other hand, just because it is impossible to assess the monetary value of injured 
feelings, awards should be restrained. To award sums which are generally felt to be 
excessive does almost as much harm to the policy and the result which it seeks as 
do nominal awards”. 
 
The court believed that awards should give effect to the qualities and purposes 
which underlie the anti-discriminatory measures in the Employment Equity Act and 
that on the one hand these awards should be sufficiently high to deter the defendant 
and others from similar behaviour in the future and on the other hand, these awards 
should also not be so exorbitant where it leads to a situation where applicants who 
have suffered minor consequences as a result of unfair discrimination reap financial 
benefits far in excess of what could be regarded as their loss.   
  
                                                     
67
  [2005] 5 BLLR 479. 
38 
CHAPTER 5 
ONUS OF PROOF 
 
Grogan,68 states that in dismissal proceedings, the onus in on the employees to 
prove that they were in fact dismissed and on the employer to show that the 
dismissal was fair.  This is somewhat different from the position that the Labour 
Court took under the 1956 LRA which was that no onus properly speaking rested on 
either party in unfair labour practices proceedings but that a court should reach its 
conclusion on the conspectus of the evidence as a whole.  
 
Grogan goes on to say that the primary significance of the onus is that when the 
evidence on a point is evenly balanced or indecisive, the balance will tip against the 
party upon whom the onus rest.  However, subject to the overall onus, the burden of 
proving particular points may shift to the party not bearing the onus on the basis of 
the principle “he who alleges must prove”.  So if the employee fails to discharge the 
evidentiary burden on a particular point, it may be that the employer will be held to 
have discharged its overall onus.  
 
With constructive dismissal, section 192 of the LRA places another burden on the 
employee that requires him to not only prove the existence of a dismissal, but also 
that the conduct of the employer was intolerable.  But, as the court in Smithkline 
Beecham (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & other69 have pointed out, that having established that 
the employer‟s conduct was intolerable does not automatically mean the employee 
can claim an unfair dismissal.  The authors of Contemporary Labour Law says that 
employers may very well have reasons, possibly due to circumstances beyond their 
control, which cause them to act in such a way that a continued employment 
relationship became intolerable for the employee, but the action of the employer may 
not necessarily be unfair or unlawful.  The onus in this instance will then fall to the 
employer to prove that his conduct was, nevertheless, neither unfair nor unlawful.  
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A good example of this is in the case of Shale v Widney Transport (Pty) Ltd.70  In this 
case about four months after being appointed as general manager of the 
respondent, Widney Transport (Pty) Ltd, the applicant, Mr Shale, resigned and 
claimed that his working life became intolerable.  The respondent denied this and 
claimed that the applicant was not suited to his post and that it had been necessary 
to suggest that he step down to a position at middle management level so that he 
could be groomed for higher responsibilities.  
 
The commissioner in this case noted that a constructive dismissal is not necessarily 
inherently unfair, if the employee proves that working conditions were intolerable, the 
employer may yet prove that they were justified or that it was not responsible for 
them.  Whether a demotion constitutes a constructive dismissal depends on the 
circumstances.  The commissioner accepted that the applicant had been unable to 
cope with his tasks as general manager, and that his superiors had devoted much 
time to assist him.  It was also proven that the applicant agreed that he would only 
concentrate on two departments, whilst his “mentor” looked after the other 
responsibilities of the general manager‟s post.  
 
Furthermore, the commissioner noted that the applicant had given a month‟s notice 
of the termination of his employment, which is inconsistent with his claim that he had 
reached a point of emotional collapse.  Since there was no evidence to show that the 
applicant‟s distress was caused by unreasonable conduct on the part of any of the 
respondent‟s employee, it could not be held liable for the applicant‟s resignation.  
This claim of constructive dismissal was dismissed.  
 
In an earlier case between Masando and Crossway,71 the actions of an employer 
who required the mother of a new born child, who just returned from maternity leave, 
to work a shift well into the night was found to be clearly intolerable, thus establishing 
a constructive dismissal.  Even though the commissioner eventually decided that the 
constructive dismissal was automatically unfair because the employer‟s decision to 
place the employee on night shift was an act of discrimination based on the 
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employee‟s family responsibilities, he gave the employer a chance to prove that the 
dismissal was fair and justifiable.  The employer admitted that it would not have been 
difficult to train the employee for the day job and that the employee on the day job 
had no special qualities entitling her to that position and she had no children.  This 
automatically unfair dismissal entitled the employee to maximum compensation.   
 
In Lesotho v Cross Border Road Transport Agency,72 the commissioner also held 
that to prove constructive dismissal, the employee must prove that the respondent 
had behaved in a manner which rendered the employment relationship intolerable.  
The applicant in this case resigned after the respondent‟s CEO ordered an 
investigation into the activities of his closed corporation.  Although the investigation 
into allegations of fraud by the applicant‟s closed corporation had started two years 
before the applicant resigned, this was not proof that it was calculated to render the 
employment relationship intolerable.  
 
It was apparent that the true reason for the applicant‟s resignation at that stage was 
to avoid facing disciplinary action.  Furthermore, the claim that the employment 
relationship had been rendered intolerable was contradicted by the fact that the 
applicant had continued work for three months after tendering his resignation.  The 
applicant had accordingly failed to prove that he had been constructively dismissed.  
 
Just as contradicting it is to carry on working for three months after your resignation 
in a claim for constructive dismissal so is a claim for reinstatement.  A claim for 
reinstatement is inconsistent with an allegation that the employee resigned because 
the employer made the employment relationship intolerable.  
 
The commissioner in Jacobs v Otis Elevator Co Ltd73 CCMA sums up the onus of 
proof in constructive dismissal quite nicely when he says that: 
 
“It is important to be cautious in adopting a wide interpretation of what conduct by an 
employer constitutes constructive dismissal because of the danger of inviting a flood 
of employees who resign and then repent and want to claim the protection of the Act, 
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especially as the dispute resolution of the Act is still in its infancy in interpreting the 
New Act. On the other hand, it would be a corruption of the Act to adopt a very 
restrictive interpretation. The definition in section 186(e) was clearly designed to 
protect employees who resign in desperation as last resort because of the unlawful or 
unfair conduct of the employer, which makes a continued employment relationship 
intolerable. Employers do have a responsibility to avoid acting in a manner that would 
be likely to destroy or undermine the employment relationship. I agree with the 
approach that one must look at the conduct of the employer as a whole and decide 
whether it was such that an employee would be entitled to say they cannot take this 
conduct any longer and must resign. A global approach would also take account of 
the conduct of the employee and the interaction between both parties in determining 
the existence of a constructive dismissal. Both case law and the Act (in s192) place 
the onus on the employee to prove the dismissal constructive or otherwise.” 
 
As constructive dismissal occurs after an employee resigns it is usually impossible 
for the employer to provide supporting documentation to prove that procedural 
fairness was adhered to or that any procedure was followed.  The employer can only 
attempt to show that its conduct was justified and that fair labour practices were 
implemented at all times.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The notion of constructive dismissal, as was mentioned earlier, originates from 
English Law.  Up until the introduction of section 186(e) of the Labour Relations Act 
of 1995, our old Industrial and Labour Appeal Courts battled with circumstances 
which justified a claim by an employee that his employer forced or coerced him or 
her to resign.74  With the constitutional right to fair labour practice in mind, the LRA 
gave a new dimension to the concept of constructive dismissal by giving it statutory 
force. 
 
In a decision of Ferrant v Key Delta,75 the court in this case and others prior to 1995 
seemed to favour the view that an essential element of a constructive dismissal was 
that the employer had breached a material term of the employment contract, hence 
justifying the employee‟s decision to terminate the contract. 
 
The landmark judgment of Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a SA Airways76 introduced the 
notion of “intolerability” wherein the employer‟s conduct as a whole was scrutinized.  
Section 186(e) of the current LRA has directed the inquiry towards the simple factual 
questions of whether the circumstance in which the employee found himself were 
“intolerable” and if so, whether they were brought about by the employer.  While it 
leaves the test for intolerability to the discretion of arbitrators, the Act clearly 
indicates that the behaviour of the employer need not amount to a repudiation, or 
even a breach of the contract. 
 
In the CCMA case of Dawtrey & Another v BBR Security (Pty) Ltd, 77  the 
commissioner made the argument that it is no longer necessary to prove breach of a 
material term of the employment contract by the employer by saying: 
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“the constitutional protection of the right to a fair labour practice is all – embracing 
and traverses well beyond the realm of purely contractual breaches.” 
 
Rudeness may be enough to prove intolerability if it is sufficiently serious and 
persistent.  However, it must clearly be persistent, serious and attributable to the 
employer. Otherwise, any hypersensitive employee can resign and claim 
compensation, which the Labour Court won‟t permit.  The circumstances of 
constructive dismissal are so infinitely various that there can be, and is, no hard and 
fast rule of establishing which circumstances justify resignation and which do not. 
 
But there are some principles and tests that have been used by arbitrators and 
judges when determining whether a constructive dismissal has taken place and 
whether it was fair or not.78  Commissioner John Grogan in CWIU obo Marele v 
Glass Centre obo Rudy draws on cases such as Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a SA 
Airways and Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots, when he 
adequately summed up the principles & test for proving that a constructive dismissal 
took place and that it was unfair.  It is as follows: 
 
1. Did the employee intend to bring an end to the employment relationship? 
 
2. Had the working relationship become so unbearable, objectively speaking that 
the employee could not fulfil his obligation to work? 
 
3. Was the intolerable situation created by the employer? 
 
4. Was the intolerable situation likely to endure for a period that justified 
termination of the relationship by the employee? 
 
5. Was the termination of the employment contract the only reasonable option 
open to the employee in the circumstances? 
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With regard to constructive dismissals under the common law, the courts have 
applied virtually the same principles under the common law as those in the LRA.  
Because the defence force is excluded from the LRA they cannot rely on the 
provisions of the LRA to substantiate a claim for constructive dismissal, hence they 
have to rely on the common law.  The big difference between a claim for constructive 
dismissal under the LRA and of that under the common law is that in statute, a claim 
for compensation is capped whilst under the common law it is not.  This is evident in 
the Murray case where the court awarded damages to the plaintiff and ordered that 
Murray was entitled to such compensation as he might prove for his constructive 
dismissal by the SANDF. 
 
Sexual harassment also became prevalent as a ground of constructive dismissal as 
many employers conducted themselves in a manner that put the employment 
relationship in jeopardy.  If continued, sexual harassment makes continued 
employment intolerable; the employee subjected to the harassment has the option of 
resigning and approaching the CCMA or a bargaining council on the basis that he or 
she was constructively and unfairly dismissed.  Just like a normal constructive 
dismissal case, cases of constructive dismissal relating to sexual harassment are not 
automatically unfair and the employer will still have to prove fairness. 
 
In Aarons v University of Stellenbosch79 the court rejected the employees claim that 
her constructive dismissal was automatically unfair because it was based on 
harassment.  The court found that a firm link needs to be established between 
discrimination and harassment. 
 
Unlike normal dismissal cases, commissioners generally award compensation as a 
remedy for constructive dismissal.  A claim by an employee for reinstatement would 
be contradicting a claim that the employment relationship became intolerable and an 
award for reinstatement would be very inappropriate in a case of constructive 
dismissal.  
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In short, unlike a normal dismissal, a constructive dismissal is a termination of the 
employment contract by the employee rather than the employer‟s own immediate 
act.  
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